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This paper studies the effect of jurisdictional barriers on the integration of long-
term credit markets in early modern Spain. Overlapping jurisdictions were behind 
many jurisdictional disputes, which obstructed market development. Using a 
gravity model with a newly constructed dataset on long-term capital flows, I show 
that belonging to the same jurisdiction increased expected long-term capital flows 
almost tenfold. This result is similar to the observations of today’s international 
trade. Even large interest rate differentials across jurisdictions do not reverse this 
pattern. 
 
 
In August 1735, Don Joseph Doz and Doña Beatriz de Funes, residents of Tarazona in the 
Crown of Aragon (province of Zaragoza), borrowed 1,000 Aragonese pounds from the 
Cathedral of Tarazona, a tidy sum since the average loan in these regions was about 50 pounds.1 
In return, Don Joseph Doz, Doña Beatriz de Funes, and their descendants had to pay a 5 per 
cent annual interest rate until full repayment of the loan. However, earlier in that same year, 20 
kilometres away in the Crown of Castile, the convent of Augustinian Recollects of Ágreda 
(province of Soria) had lent 26,000 reales, approximately 1,400 Aragonese pounds, to the city 
council at 3 per cent annual interest in January 1735.2 This too was a tidy sum considering that 
the annual wage of a day labourer in Madrid was about 860 reales.3 So why did Don Joseph 
Doz and his wife not borrow from the convent of Augustinian Recollects in the Crown of Castile 
at a lower interest rate just 20 kilometres away from where the couple lived?  
 
For North, who tries to think about the transition from feudalism to capitalism, markets 
developed when property rights were secured and transaction costs dwindled, that is, when the 
state became a major player in societies. The state, through the judicial and notarial institutions 
that it developed from the thirteenth century, assumed the role of contract enforcer and reduced 
transaction costs related to uncertainty and risk.4 Epstein gave an overview of this great 
economic transition. He especially argued that the development of legal systems in the late 
Middle Ages, along with state formation, gave rise to market development and economic 
growth.5 Legal institutions created the conditions for a credible and predictable justice. They 
guaranteed the enforcement of transactions, enabling a rational allocation of production factors 
that improved productivity.  
 
                                                          
1 Archivo Histórico de Protocolos de Tarazona (thereafter AHPT), caja 447/01. 
2 Archivo Histórico Provincial de Soria (thereafter AHPS), caja 1755, vol. 2627. One Aragonese pound is 
equivalent to 19 reales. 
3 A day labourer in Madrid earned, on average, around four reales per day (Pinto Crespo and Madrazo Madrazo, 
Madrid, p. 203). In keeping with Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, ‘The decline of Spain’, p. 327, I 
assume that day labourers worked between 180 and 250 days p.a. (for a full list of sources, see idem, ‘The rise and 
fall’, p. 7), which makes for an average of 215 days. As such, a day labourer in Madrid would have earned around 
860 reales p.a. in the eighteenth century. 
4 North, ‘Institutions’. 
5 Epstein, Freedom and growth. 
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Nevertheless, Epstein sticks to the observation of the norm and legal systems, without going 
back too much in the analysis of the enforcement of the former or the activity of the latter. In 
the case of Spain, the composite nature of the monarchy made for many jurisdictional disputes, 
causing delays and uncertainty in legal procedures despite the development of a system of 
norms and legal institutions from the fifteenth century. Most recently, Grafe showed that 
peripheral historic territories and powerful interior cities exacerbated jurisdictional obstacles to 
trade, hindering market integration.6 It might be the case that Don Joseph Doz and his wife 
could not borrow on the other side of the border because of strong jurisdictional barriers 
between Spain’s historic territories. 
 
To test this analysis, I explore the interaction between on the one hand, the judicial system, and 
on the other hand, private credit. Examination of long-term mortgage’s credit markets offers a 
good observation of jurisdictional fragmentation as it provides a fundamental measure of 
transaction costs, and especially enforcement costs in the event of litigation.7 Grafe showed the 
importance of jurisdictional obstacles to internal trade in early modern Spain.8 They can also 
act as a deterrent to capital flows between jurisdictions. In the event of a dispute, overlapping 
jurisdictions increase the enforcement costs of a contract, which raises the risk of cross-border 
lending. This raises two questions: does the development of norms and legal systems say 
anything on its efficiency? More precisely, what was the impact of jurisdictional barriers on the 
coordination of legal systems and the integration of markets?  
 
 
 
I 
 
 
In the early modern period, Spain was divided into a number of historic territories: Castile and 
Leon, Aragon (including the Kingdom of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia), Navarre, the Basque 
Provinces, and the Balearic islands (see Figure 1). Each of these territories had its own 
jurisdictional and legal systems.  
 
The analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation as an obstacle to market development has been 
present in Spanish historiography since the 1990s. In this historiography, Spain is described as 
a composite monarchy which was a polity “including more than one country under the 
sovereignty of one ruler” and which meant “a profound respect for corporate structures and for 
traditional rights, privileges and customs”.9 The king had to coexist with a myriad of smaller 
territorial and jurisdictional units jealously guarding their independent status. He did not have 
the monopoly of day-to-day coercion, and sovereign justice had to coexist with strong 
jurisdictions in highly specific fields such as tax collection, military levies, market regulations, 
                                                          
6 In Distant tyranny, Grafe analysed how different fiscal systems could create differentials in prices of goods at 
the city level ceteris paribus. 
7 Too few studies examine Spain’s capital market integration. Bernholz and Kugler, in ‘Financial market 
integration’, showed that between 1564 and 1603, deviations of up to six per cent between the Spanish Ducado 
and the Dutch Groat were possible between Seville and Medina del Campo. Álvarez-Nogal, in ‘Oferta y demanda’, 
looked at the market for public annuities between 1540 and 1740 and noticed high differentials in the rates of 
return. However, no one analysed long-term capital markets and related capital market fragmentation to 
jurisdictional fragmentation.  
8 Grafe, Distant tyranny. 
9 Elliott, ‘Composite monarchies’; Koenigsberguer, Politicians and virtuosi. 
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and civil and criminal law in general. Cardim et al even coin early modern Spain as a 
“polycentric monarchy”.10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Early Modern Spain 
 
 
Note: The rectangle indicates the geographical area of study. 
 
 
 
Constant negotiations between the king and the different bodies of the monarchy point to a 
fundamental aspect of the composite monarchy's political economy that was crucial in shaping 
the institutional framework in which economic activities would evolve. In all of the Spanish 
Habsburgs’ possessions, negotiations were conducted between the centralizing power of the 
king and the local and corporate agents. Everywhere, political pacts emerged that entangled the 
nobilities, the cities and their oligarchies, the clergy and even some merchants and merchant 
corporations with the crown’s interests. Non-monetary aspects were an essential element of 
these pacts. In Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia and Navarre, political pacts reached 
                                                          
10 Cardim et al, Polycentric monarchies. See also Herrero Sánchez, La monarquía hispánica.  
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between the crown and the elites and parliaments preserved the institutional system and even 
gave, not money, but greater autonomy and privileges to the towns and historic territories.11 
 
The repercussions of these political pacts are crucial to understanding the political economy of 
the composite monarchy. Among other things, they upheld the elite's coercive powers in most 
territories, particularly in Castile. Market development needs to be assessed from this angle. 
Elliott first wrote about seventeenth-century Spain that “the institutional and legal diversity of 
the kingdoms of the monarchy represented an intolerable impediment to ... maximize 
resources”.12 He suggested here that jurisdictional fragmentation had been a serious obstacle to 
market development. Market formation is closely related to the evolution of transaction costs. 
By maintaining high transaction costs, jurisdictional fragmentation clearly held back the 
integration of capital markets in Spain. However, the impact of jurisdictional fragmentation has 
to be understood not only between kingdoms but also within, between cities where political 
power was concentrated. Yun Casalilla especially emphasized the role of urban oligarchies and 
cities as the keystone of the Spanish political system.13    
 
In this paper, I examine Spain’s legal systems and their level uniformity and cooperation which 
defines the extent to which jurisdictions were fragmented. To look at legal fragmentation is all 
the more important since Epstein argued that the road towards market integration passed by the 
development and uniformity of legal systems.14 The judicial system was shaped by the very 
nature of the composite monarchy. Despite the union of the Crown of Castile and the Crown of 
Aragon, both crowns continued to be treated as separate entities, and the monarchy remained 
divided across a variety of kingdoms. According to seventeenth-century Spanish jurist Juan de 
Solorzano Pereira, Spanish kingdoms were unified in the form of aeque principaliter, which 
preserved their own legal and political constitutions (fueros), and privileges.15 The accession of 
the new Bourbon dynasty to the Spanish throne in 1700, and the revolt of the Catalans, 
Aragonese and Valencians against its legitimacy (1701-15) did not change the rule. Even the 
promulgation of the Nueva Planta decrees by Philip V from 1707 to 1716 did not greatly affect 
the historic territories' legal systems.16 Despite later claims to the contrary, the Crown of Aragon 
retained its essentially constitutionalist and contractual character.17 The Catalans and the 
Aragonese kept their civil and most of their criminal law and only Valencia was somehow 
“castilianized”.18 Historic territories remained in many respects kingdoms apart, and saw no 
major changes to their traditional laws, institutions and customs prior to the mid-nineteenth 
century.  
 
                                                          
11 Yun Casalilla, Marte contra Minerva, pp. 312-23. 
12 Elliott, ‘Composite monarchies, p. 63. 
13 Schaub, ‘La penisola iberica’ and Yun Casalilla, ‘Cambiamento e continuità’ provided an important 
bibliography on the subject. The works the most representative on the general vision of the Spanish monarchy are 
Fernandez Albaladejo, Fragmentos; Jago, ‘Habsburg absolutism’; idem, ‘Philip II’; Thompson, ‘Crown and 
Cortes’; idem, ‘Absolutism’. In more detail, Fortea Pérez, Monarquía y Cortes, illustrated relations between urban 
oligarchies and the monarchy, while Yun Casalilla studied the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility 
(see Yun Casalilla, ‘Aristocracia’, for the period before 1600 and idem, ‘La situación económica’ for the 
seventeenth century). Finally, Grafe and Irigoin challenged the vision of a predatory monarchy in the Spanish 
empire (Grafe and Irigoin, ‘Bargaining for absolutism’; idem, ‘A stakeholder empire’).   
14 Epstein, Freedom and growth. 
15 Elliott, ‘Composite monarchies’, p. 53. 
16 These were a number of decrees enacted by Philip V to end the institutions, privileges and ancient charters of 
the provinces of the Crown of Aragon (Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia and Mallorca). 
17 Elliott, ‘Composite monarchies’, p. 61. 
18 Tomas y Valiente, Manual de historia, pp. 369-82. 
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The development of the royal justice system throughout the entire territory did not lift the 
jurisdictional obstacles between historic territories. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the 
chancellerías and audiencias, the main royal justice institutions, were developed and improved 
throughout the territory of Spain along with the number and professionalism of judges and 
letrados.19 The development of the main royal justice institutions was accompanied by the 
publication of legal codes such as the Nueva Recopilación de Leyes. This “legal revolution”, to 
use Kagan's words, created leeway to improve the enforcement of royal justice. The 
development of these institutions throughout the territory and the new legal codes should have 
paved the way to reduce transaction costs and improve the integration of markets.20 However, 
analysis of these institutions’ activities and enforcement of the law tell a different story. Judicial 
cooperation was very limited between historic territories. Castilian chancillerías were not 
independent third parties. The balance of power and patronage in the Court made for a great 
deal of arbitrariness in the system, as shown by Owens in a famous legal case involving two 
powerful litigants, the city of Toledo and the Duke of Béjar.21 Laws claim to ensure impartiality, 
but judges relate to a particular social reality from which they cannot or do not want to escape. 
For instance, an analysis of the letters sent to Juan Manuel Villena, president of the chancellería 
of Granada in 1758, shows that the judge was involved in numerous social networks that 
influenced the court ruling.22 This was all the more true at local level.  
 
In each judicial district (partido judicial), day-to-day justice was performed by corregidores or 
alcaldes mayores in the court of second instance (appeal) and by alcaldes ordinarios or 
peatones in the court of first instance.23 In royal domains, the king (the Cámara) appointed the 
corregidores and alcaldes mayores from among the urban elite. In lordships, the Lord chose 
them. The alcaldes ordinarios or peatones were elected by the city council of each town or 
village and were then approved by the corregidor or the alcalde mayor.24 The justice 
administration in early modern Spain clearly had the latitude for at least partial justice. Judges 
were entrenched in political and social networks and concerns. It is therefore worth analysing 
both the judges, whose office was not for sale unlike in France, for example, and the influence 
of administrative offices on court rulings. Gómez González showed how the sale of 
administrative offices in the chancillería of Granada influenced the application of justice. Many 
offices hence escaped royal control, including the alcaldes in the chamber of nobility (the sala 
de hijodalgos), provincial notaries (secondary chancillería magistrates) and a fair number of 
subordinate posts such as collectors, court clerks and prosecutors. The consequences of this 
alienation of royal control were legion. The privatization of these offices led these officers to 
seek to make their investment profitable and sell their services for a fee.25 The king's judicial 
system was therefore rooted in local and corporative concerns.  
 
 
 
II 
 
 
                                                          
19 Kagan, Lawsuits and litigants. 
20 Epstein, Freedom and growth. 
21 Owens, “By my absolute royal authority”. 
22 Castellano Castellano and Gómez González, ‘Reflexiones sobre la justicia’. 
23 Heras Santos, ‘La organización de la justicia’. 
24 Idem, pp. 126-35. 
25 Gómez González, La justicia. 
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The impact of these jurisdictional differences can be observed within the legal framework that 
regulated long-term mortgage’s credit and in particular debt collection procedures whenever a 
borrower failed to pay the rent.     
 
Private credit transactions fell into the domain of royal courts.26 The courts had to enforce the 
legal code where the trial took place.27 If we come back to our first example, in case of any 
dispute, Agreda’s judges would have had to comply with the legal code of Castile and 
Tarazona’s judges would have had to enforce the Aragonese legal code. Examining debt 
collection proceedings when comparing these two legal codes, the only difference lay in the 
statute of limitations set at 30 years in Aragon and 10 years in Castile.28 The rest of the 
proceedings were strictly similar under the two codes. Borrowers were consequently judged 
under a common jurisdiction (the royal jurisdiction) and by the same rules irrespective of 
whether their debt hearing was held in Aragon or Castile.  
 
The existence of similar legal provisions across territorial jurisdictions does not actually reflect 
the problems lenders faced if the borrower lived in another jurisdiction. If the parties resided in 
two separate territorial jurisdictions, two scenarios were possible depending on whether the two 
jurisdictions were part of a same kingdom or not. The first scenario reveals a number of 
obstacles. To begin with, the judge was only competent in his territorial jurisdiction. For 
example, if the lender took the borrower to court in jurisdiction A and the borrower resided in 
jurisdiction B, then the borrower's assets could only be seized by a judge in the jurisdiction 
where the assets were located. So to seize them, the judge in jurisdiction A had to send a request, 
called requisitoria, to the judge in jurisdiction B for each judicial act (notification, sentence, 
foreclosure). Court cases were expensive at the time and any request entailed an additional 
fee.29 Enforcement of the request was also uncertain. Local judges were elected within their 
own jurisdiction.30 It would therefore be reasonable to assume that if Judge B received a request 
to sue one of his electors, he might have taken more time to enforce the request.31  
 
Enforcement of legal proceedings for the lender became even more uncertain when both parties 
resided in separate kingdoms. Through to the end of the fifteenth century, extradition of 
offenders between kingdoms was in a way “voluntary” as no legal provisions existed regarding 
the matter.32 In the early modern period, the different kingdoms of the Spanish monarchy signed 
extradition treaties to regulate extradition and solve the problem. These treaties and legal 
provisions defined a precise framework for extraditions. Between the Kingdom of Aragon and 
                                                          
26 Probably in order to restrict jurisdictional disputes in credit transactions, Castilian and Aragonese notaries used 
to insert a waiver clause when drawing up a contract. Both parties had to waive their local laws and customs and 
to submit to royal justice. 
27 Martinez, M. S. don, Librería de jueces, ultísima y universal (Madrid, 7th edn. 1791), tome I, chap. II, p. 98. 
28 In Castile, debt collection proceedings were laid down in Volume V of the Novísima Recopilación (see the 
Novísima Recopilación de Leyes de España, tome V, book XI, pp. 169-302). Proceedings in Aragon derived from 
the fueros and especially the proceso de aprehensión. The proceso de apprehensión is one of the four procesos 
forales of Aragon. It is described in La Ripa, J. F. don, Ilustración a los cuatro procesos forales de Aragón 
(Zaragoza, 1764), part I, “Del Proceso de Aprehensión”, pp. 1-218. Differences between Castile and Aragon are 
well described in Martinez, M. S. don, Librería de jueces, ultísima y universal (Madrid, 7th edn. 1791), tome I, 
chap. I, II, and III; and especially pp. 470-1. 
29 For instance, the cost of one request in Madrid in 1828 was 20 reales (if it did not exceed two pages), plus eight 
reales for the judicial decree of enforcement. See Martinez Salazar, A. don, Práctica de sustanciar pleitos 
ejecutivos y ordinarios (Madrid, 5th edn. 1828), pp. 234-5. 
30 Heras Santos, ‘La organización de la justicia’, Lorenzo Cadarso, ‘Los tribunales castellanos’. 
31 Lorenzana de la Puente, ‘Jueces y pleitos’. 
32 Ferrer Mallol, Entre la paz y la Guerra. 
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Castile, extraditions concerned “capital offence, forgers ... murderers, etc.”, but never 
mentioned debt.33 
 
The absence of a clear legal framework governing extradition for debt collection sentences may 
have seriously undermined the effectiveness of a court sentences in debt collection cases. In 
addition to the absence of a legal framework governing extradition, it appears that requests were 
not efficiently implemented between kingdoms. In 1580, the Cortes of the Kingdom of Navarre 
complained in these terms: 
 
 
In accordance with the law and ancient traditions of these kingdoms, when someone 
is absent, and is called to court, we send a request (requisitoria) to notify him of his 
official summons. And it seems that … those of the Kingdom of Aragon do not 
consent to notify the requests sent to this kingdom against those who reside in it. This 
is against the law, justice and good administration.34 
 
 
This complaint shows that the judges of Aragon did not act on requests from the judges of 
Navarre. This is not an isolated case. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, a trade conflict 
erupted between two Basque provinces: the province of Vizcaya and the province of Guipuzcoa. 
To put pressure on its neighbour, Guipuzcoa decided to stop acting on Vizcaya's requests.35 
This effectively blocked all legal disputes between the two provinces. Judicial cooperation was 
therefore restricted to the historic territories. Personal, commercial and political interests could 
hence impede the sound functioning of the royal justice system.  
 
Even more importantly, it appears that natives could not be extradited to another kingdom 
within the Spanish monarchy. If Mr Y was a native of and resided in Kingdom B and was sued 
by Mr X in Kingdom A for debt, the former could not be handed over to the latter's jurisdiction. 
For instance, Navarre’s laws stipulated: “Firstly, the natives of this kingdom, for no reason 
whatsoever, either civil or criminal, can be expelled from it”.36 In order to seize Mr Y's assets, 
Mr X would have had to sue Mr Y in Kingdom B: “In accordance with the law, offenders who 
commit a crime in another kingdom or province can be judged and sentenced in the place and 
the kingdom from whence they originate”.37 Clearly, this could have been a source of many 
obstacles. Mr X would have had to go to Mr Y's kingdom in order to take him to court and 
prove his allegations. At best, he could have appointed a court agent to represent him, thereby 
avoiding long journeys. Second, if not the most obvious, local matters could have influenced 
the judge's decision in favour of Mr Y.  
 
On the borrower’s side now, another obstacle lies in the fact that proceedings took place in the 
jurisdiction where the lender filed the suit. Borrowers then either had to go to the court in person 
to defend themselves or appoint an attorney to represent them before the court, assuming that 
borrowers had the necessary connections in the jurisdiction where the hearing took place. This 
no doubt acted as a deterrent to borrowers when it came to taking out a loan in a different 
jurisdiction.   
 
                                                          
33 A full list can be found in Novísima Recopilación, II, VIII, pp. 414-5. 
34 Own translation. Novísima Recopilación de Navarra (1735), tome II, "Proceder contra los ausentes", p. 681. 
35 Lasa, ‘Notas’, p. 512. 
36 Novísima Recopilación de Navarra (1735), tome II, "Proceder con los Ausentes", pp. 686--7 
37 Idem. 
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Application of the law was therefore uncertain if parties came from different jurisdictions. Legal 
risk and enforcement costs were much higher, which definitely increased transaction costs. 
Clearly, these differences affected long-term capital markets, especially small loans for which 
fixed transaction costs were proportionally higher. Two main hypotheses derive from this 
analysis. First, formal institutional barriers were a major obstacle to capital flows between 
kingdoms (H1). Second, informal institutions restricted capital flows within kingdoms between 
different courts (H2).  
 
 
 
III 
 
   
In this section, I examine the impact of jurisdictional barriers between kingdoms -- the first 
level of jurisdictional fragmentation -- on capital market integration (H1). I consider the 
mortgage’s credit market in two neighbouring kingdoms, the Crown of Castile and the Kingdom 
of Aragon. The examination of capital flows between these two regions proves exceptionally 
rewarding, since interest rates between them differed by two percentage points during the first 
half of the eighteenth century.  
 
 
Like many other regions in Europe, the predominant instruments of long-term private credit in 
Spain were redeemable annuities (censos consignativos).38 The censo was a mortgage-backed 
loan which can be compared to the French rente constituée or the Italian censo consegnativo. 
The contract was supported by collateral that could be a real asset such as a land, a farm, a 
house, or another mortgage loan. One of the characteristics of the censo was that the lender 
could not demand the capital from the borrower: the latter repaid the capital whenever he 
wanted. This was the only debt instrument that could involve the explicit payment of interest, 
as long as this did not exceed a legal maximum rate.39 In the crown of Aragon, the censos 
consignativos were called censales. Censos and censales were exactly the same kind of 
mortgage-secured loans. Contemporaneous notaries used to draw them up with the same terms 
and conditions to the extent that they can be considered as substitutes.40 
 
Interest rates on these loans were regulated by public authorities (the Cortes and the king), 
which set an interest cap. Interest rates on loans could be set below the cap, but not above it. 
Crucially, in Spain, this cap differed nationwide from 1705 to 1750. On 12 February 1705, 
Philip V reduced the interest cap from 5 to 3 per cent in the Crown of Castile for censos, but 
kept it at 5 per cent in the Crown of Aragon through to 1750 for censales.41  
                                                          
38 For the dominance of censos in eighteenth-century long-term capital market, see Tello Aragay, “El papel del 
crédito rural”, p. 10, for a list of authors; Ruiz Martín, La Banca. Three types of censos co-existed in early modern 
Spain. The censo enfiteútico was a loan-lease contract. It was generally a lifetime or perpetual loan. Another legally 
defined censo was the censo reservativo, the sale of a property by credit. These were two forms of indirect credit. 
By the sixteenth century, a new form of censo became popular. It was the legally defined censo consignativo and 
the only one akin to a mortgage (Quiroz, “Reassessing the role of credit”). In the rest of the paper, I will use the 
word censo instead of censo consignativo for convenience. 
39 Fiestas Loza, "El censo consignativo". 
40 For Castile, see Febrero, J. don, Libreria de escribanos, é instruccion juridical theorico práctica de principantes 
(Madrid, 1789), part I, tome II, chap. V, pp. 185-303. For Aragon, see Alliaga Bayod y Salas Guasqui, M. don, El 
escribano perfecto, espejo de escribanos teorico-practico (1789, Tarragona), tome II, pp. 7-135. For a complete 
list of contemporaneous notaries' books, see Luján Muñoz, “La literatura notarial”. 
41 As soon as the king enacted his royal order, the interest rate was reduced to 3 per cent on all existing and future 
censos in Castile. 
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The king's decision to lower the maximum legal rate was not taken overnight. It was the result 
of a balance of power that progressively tipped in favour of indebted landowners, urban classes 
and cities (represented by the Cortes) against ecclesiastical institutions.42 However, the 
reduction was not extended to the Crown of Aragon. Aragon had its own representative 
assemblies, at least through to 1707, and any such reform would also have had to have been 
approved by these assemblies before being able to be enforced in the realm. In addition, the 
reform came in the midst of the War of the Spanish Succession that divided Spain between 
Castile in support of Philip V and Aragon in support of the Habsburg monarch.43 When the war 
ended in 1714, the question of extending the reform to Aragon was raised.44 However, the 
systematic opposition of the Aragonese Church delayed enactment of the interest rate cap 
reduction until 1750.45 A large gap therefore stood between the two crowns for 45 years.   
 
The differential could reasonably be expected to have triggered critical capital flows between 
Aragon and Castile during this period. Lending at 5 per cent might allow for riskier projects, 
whereas more collateral may be required at 3 per cent.46 On the one hand, lower risk borrowers 
would therefore go to the Castilian side or the interest rate in Aragon would have converged 
towards the interest cap of Castile (H1a). On the other hand, higher risk borrowers would go to 
the Aragonese side (H1b).  
 
To test these hypotheses, I selected a number of cities in the two neighbouring provinces of 
Soria in Castile and Zaragoza in Aragon. I chose them within a 20-kilometre radius from the 
border to limit transport cost issues and capture the jurisdictional effect on capital flows.47 This 
corridor has also certain advantages in terms of similar geographic conditions and no major 
geographic obstacles. I also checked for the existence of transport networks between the two 
provinces. Given the availability of sources, I recorded all the mortgages registered in notaries’ 
records signed in 1725 and 1735 in three cities (Ágreda, Noviercas and Ólvega) in the province 
of Soria (Old Castile) and one city (Tarazona) in the province of Zaragoza (Aragon).48 I chose 
these years as being far enough away from the 1705 rate cap reduction reform in Castile, the 
end of the war between Castile and the Kingdon of Aragon in 1707, and the implementation of 
the rate cap reduction in Aragon in 1750.  
 
I observed 56 censos consignativos in Castile and 32 censales in Aragon. Mortgage credit 
activity was actually quite substantial since these cities were relatively small and this type of 
                                                          
42 Alvarez Vázquez, “El memorial” and idem, Rentas, pp. 279-91. Ecclesiastical institutions were the main 
providers of long-term credit. 
43 This assessment is clearly made by the royal order of 1750: “Remaining the crown of Aragon with the same 
interest of 5 per cent, because the situation in which it was found, did not allow for such a reduction”. 
44 Again, this is clear from the royal order of 1750: “and once abolished its fueros … many doubts were raised as 
to whether the reform could be extended to it [the Crown of Aragon]”. 
45 In a memorandum to the king around 1720, the Cathedral of Valencia listed all the Aragonese Church’s 
arguments against reducing the interest rate cap on the censales. See Reflexiones, que el cabildo, y canonigos de 
la santa metropolitana iglesia de Valencia, exponen a los señores del real consejo de Castilla sobre el precio de 
los censos de aquel reyno, available at http://dadun.unav.edu/handle/10171/30903. 
46 Stiglitz, J. E. and Weiss, A., ‘Credit rationing with collateral’, Bell Communications Research Economics 
Discussion Paper no. 12, show potential adverse selection in credit transactions with collateral. 
47 Traditionally, historians blamed Spain’s rugged geography and resulting transport problems for slow market 
integration across Spain (Ringrose, Transportation). However, Grafe reported that these technical issues were 
solved “slowly, but surely” over time (Grafe, ‘Tyrannie à distance’, p. 12). 
48 Data comes from 16 notaries’ records, among them 13 concentrated the bulk of the deeds. Ólvega and Noviercas 
used to have only one notary, whereas Ágreda and Tarazona hosted at least two of them. 
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credit was long term.49 Noviercas and Ólvega were situated along the border with Aragon. As 
mentioned above, Ágreda was the administrative centre of a corregimiento and the main city 
on the road from Soria, the capital of the province, to Tarazona in Aragon. It was just 20 
kilometres away from Tarazona.  
 
Tarazona is a more important city. Also the administrative centre of a corregimiento and a 
bishopric, it was the second largest town (after Zaragoza) in the province of Zaragoza in the 
eighteenth century.50 Located in the Queiles valley linking the Ebro valley to the Meseta, the 
city stands at a crossroads between Aragon, La Rioja, Navarra and Castile. Therefore anyone 
travelling between Zaragoza and the Meseta (where Madrid is located) had to pass through 
Tarazona, Ágreda, and Soria.  
 
All the contracts contain the borrower and lender’s names, place of residence, the capital 
borrowed, the annual rent and the collateral pledged as security. Among the Aragonese loans, 
13 contracts (40 per cent) provide information on the borrower’s profession: seven labourers, 
one doctor, one knitter, one chandler, one wool dresser and two friars from the Cathedral of 
Tarazona. Seven borrowers (20 per cent) bore the title “Don” and usually borrowed larger 
amounts than the others. The title “Don” does not necessarily refer to the nobility. It can also 
refer to important people in trade or the administration, for instance. Among the Castilian loans 
now, only two contracts mention the borrower’s profession – one notary and one presbyter – 
and only three of them (5 per cent) bore the title “Don”. The largest amount of capital (26,000 
reales) was borrowed by the city council of Ágreda. With respect to the contracts where 
profession is not mentioned, there is good reason to believe that most of the borrowers were 
labourers or small craftsmen, given that they did not know how to write and generally borrowed 
small amounts secured against small plots of land. Regarding the lenders, ecclesiastical 
institutions provided 94 per cent of the capital lent in Castile and 92 per cent in Aragon. This 
confirms the dominant position of ecclesiastical institutions in long-term credit markets in 
eighteenth-century Spain. The reason for the loan is only given in four contracts: to buy land, a 
mill and solve financial difficulties.51 
 
The two markets differed on one point though. Table 1 shows the amounts lent in Castile and 
in Aragon. Both the mean and the median were higher in Tarazona than in Castilian cities. This 
corroborates the importance of Tarazona as an economic center compared with Ágreda, 
Noviercas, and Ólvega.   
 
 
 
Table 1: Private annuities in Castile and Aragon (grams of silver), 1725 and 1735. 
 
                                                          
49 Aranda’s census (1768) counted 3,594 inhabitants in Ágreda, 1,108 in Noviercas and 1,142 in Ólvega. One 
could object that mortgage credit is mostly urban whereas obligations are used in rural areas. However, my sample 
draws a rather different picture since censos represented 61% of credit transactions in Castile and 52% in Aragon. 
This might be due to the particular structure of Spanish credit markets where ecclesiastical institutions were the 
main lenders and almost exclusively resorted to this type of contract. In addition, these two instruments served 
different purposes. Obligations recorded were short term, from three months to a year, and were more akin to 
commercial credit. In most cases, they were used to pay for agricultural or industrial products and services. This 
demonstrates that obligations were not an alternative to mortgage credit when interest rates differed between 
Aragonese and Castilian annuities.    
50 In 1768, Tarazona counted 6,060 inhabitants (Aranda’s census). 
51 The same reasons are given by Tello Aragay, ‘El papel del crédito rural’, p. 11, and Fernández de Pinedo, ‘Del 
censo a la obligación’, p. 301. 
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 Castilea Aragonb 
Number of contracts 56 32 
Total amount 101,630 125,136 
Mean 1,814 3,910 
Median 781 1,186 
a Ágreda, Noviercas, and Ólvega. 
b Tarazona. 
Sources: See text. Monetary equivalences are derived from Feliu, Precios, p. 20 and Fernandez 
de la Ferrería, M., Nuevo tratado de reduccion de monedas, efectivas, e imaginarias, de estos 
Reynos de España, a reales de vellon (Madrid, 1803). 
 
 
All annuities bore the maximum legal interest rate: 3 per cent in Castile and 5 per cent in 
Aragon. In other words, 20 or 30 years after the differential was introduced, the interest rate in 
Aragon had not converged towards Castile’s and remained stuck at the maximum legal rate 
whereas it could have been lower, which discards part of the first hypothesis (H1a).  
 
Under these conditions, lower risk Aragonese inhabitants should have stopped borrowing in 
Tarazona and gone 20 kilometres away to Ágreda, for example, to borrow at 3 per cent. 
Although I cannot conclude that there was a decrease in loan transactions in Tarazona,52 I can 
examine capital mobility and capture possible foot-voting effects by looking at the city of origin 
of borrowers and lenders in Castile and Aragon. 
 
 
Figure 2: Borrowers’ hometown in Ágreda, Noviercas, and Ólvega, 1725 and 1735. 
 
                                                          
52 Some notaries’ records are missing, which makes it impossible to see the full lending picture in Tarazona at the 
time. 
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Note: Cities with a cross are given for information only.  
Sources: AHPS, for 1725, see cajas 1737, 2367, and 2443. For 1735, see cajas 1740, 1755, 
1774, 2369, and 2446. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that not one single person from Aragon borrowed in Castile in 1725 and 1735. 
On the other hand, I also examine the borrowers’ hometowns based on the 32 contracts signed 
in Tarazona (Aragon).53 This city, close to the border, should have attracted risky Castilian 
borrowers offering higher rates of return, but not one single person from Castile went to borrow 
at 5 per cent in Tarazona. Riskier borrowers did not move to Aragon in order to finance their 
projects. 
 
Except by assuming that all potential borrowers were high risk in Aragon and low risk in 
Castile, such an absence of credit transactions between the two neighbouring regions despite a 
two percentage point differential is highly surprising. 
 
To definitely discard H1a and H1b, an analysis of loan contracts in Castile and Aragon further 
reveals no difference in the kind of collateral pledged as surety.54 Borrowers in Aragon were 
not particularly riskier than their counterparts in Castile. To come back to my first example, 
Don Joseph and Doña Beatriz either preferred to borrow 1,000 Aragonese pounds at 5 per cent 
in Tarazona for some reason, when they could have borrowed at 3 per cent just 20 kilometres 
away, or did not find any lender in Castile willing to provide the amount needed, not because 
                                                          
53 AHPT, for 1725: cajas 420/02 and 442/02; for 1734-7: cajas 459/02, 447/01, 469/01, and 475/02. 
54 As mentioned, the type of activity financed is only given in four cases. The usual reasons given are to buy land 
or a house or solve financial difficulties. No differences are found in the type of activities financed by Castilian 
and Aragonese contracts. 
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their project was risky or the amount of collateral provided was not sufficient, but because the 
collateral they provided was located on the other side of the border.  
 
Loan transactions between Aragonese and Castilians might be thought to have been easier to 
set up in large cities than small towns, as there was a better chance of finding a financial 
intermediary in a large city to conduct the transactions. For instance, Marcos Martín showed 
how the provincial house of the Theresian Carmelite Order in Valladolid managed to pool 
capital across its network of convents, lending it to the city council of Valladolid and rich 
nobles.55 This would imply that interregional credit transactions mainly took place in more 
important cities. To test this hypothesis, Figure 3 examines the borrowers’ hometowns in the 
capital of the province, Soria. I do not find any borrowers from Aragon, even though the city’s 
elite could have expanded their coverage outside the province of Soria.   
 
 
Figure 3: Borrowers’ hometown in Soria, 1735. 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Cities with a cross are given for information only. Viniegra was part of the province of 
Soria at the time.  
Sources: AHPS, cajas 1516, 1572, 1633, 1643, 1660, and 1681. There were six notaries in Soria 
at the time, but only four concentrated the bulk of credit transactions. 
 
 
 
There is also the possibility that currency exchange fees between kingdoms were too high and 
offset the differential. Moneys of account were different between the two regions. In the 
Kingdom of Aragon, contracts were drawn up in libras jaquesas (Aragonese pounds), while in 
Castile, they used the real de vellón. However, these currencies were not the actual money that 
                                                          
55 Marcos Martín, ‘La actividad crediticia’.  
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people used. Sometimes, the notary specified which coins were transferred between lender and 
borrower. Usually, they were gold coins (monedas de oro) or silver coins (monedas de plata) 
in use everywhere in Spain, if not internationally like the eight-real coin (real de a ocho). The 
common practice was for the parties to write in the contract that the transferred coins could be 
used in every kingdom, "monedas corrientes de estos reinos”. In addition, Philip V’s monetary 
reforms at the beginning of the eighteenth century promoted the Castilian monetary system in 
the Crown of Aragon and gradually made its use widespread.56 This means that, despite 
different moneys of account, the coins used were broadly the same across kingdoms. This shows 
that there was no exchange rate or commission on private loans between kingdoms that might 
have explained the market fragmentation.    
 
Of course, these markets were mainly local. In my sample, all transactions in Tarazona involved 
citizens within Tarazona’s jurisdiction. In the three Castilian cities studied, the average distance 
between borrower and lender’s hometowns was 14.6 kilometres in 1725 and 3.5 kilometres in 
1735, with distances ranging from zero to 42.5 kilometres (between Soria and Noviercas). 
 
The level of information that the lender can obtain on the borrower is crucial, especially on 
long-term credit markets. The Aragonese might have preferred to borrow in Aragon where they 
could borrow from family and friends. Likewise, Castilian lenders might have preferred to lend 
to relatives living in their neighbourhood. In addition, the nature of the lenders, namely 
ecclesiastical institutions, might have reinforced intra-family lending. Administrators of pious 
funds in ecclesiastical institutions frequently tend to lend to family members and acquaintances.    
 
However, in my sample, only two contracts explicitly stipulate a family relationship between 
borrower and lender. In one case, the daughter's dowry was lent to the father and, in the other 
case, an uncle lent to his nephew. Only three contracts bear any connection between the 
borrower's name and the lender's name or administrators' names. It seems that administrators 
of pious funds actually lent to any kind of individual as long as the person provided solid 
guarantees. Ecclesiastical institutions might have sidestepped some asymmetric information 
problems inherent to these societies. Whenever some capital was paid back or deposited in a 
pious foundation, the information was circulated that there was capital available for credit, 
either by an announcement (pregón) or by a simple poster (cartel). Potential borrowers had to 
provide administrators with a memorandum on the actual assets that they could put up as 
collateral with an evaluation of their value and the names of at least two witnesses who would 
certify that they actually owned the collateral and that the evaluation was sound. For example, 
on average, the amount of the loan represented 30 per cent of the value of collateral in Soria, 
with extreme values comprised between 13 and 33 per cent. This is slightly lower than the ratio 
found by Sánchez González in the province of Toledo.57 
 
Once the administrators had examined and accepted the application, they had to request 
permission to loan from the diocese, which was in charge of most pious foundations and had 
the final say in the matter. One of these letters read:  
 
 
My Lord,  
 
The bearer of this letter, who is Pedro Frances, resident of this town of Borobia, asks 
for the two censos which Don Manuel Ruiz, priest of Golmaio, has redeemed before 
                                                          
56 Ruiz Trapero, ‘La unidad’; De Santiago Fernández, ‘Legislación y reforma monetaria’. 
57 Sánchez González, ‘El crédito rural’. 
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Your Grace. The mortgages offered are a house worth two thousand reales and an 
estate of two and a quarter yugadas within the bounds of this town, whose value is 
thirty ducats, said mortgages as I am informed are free and of the stated value, so that 
if you consider them sufficient, you may extend the said censos with the 
corresponding deeds, which will be granted by the aforementioned Pedro and his wife 
Maria Coloma, whose house is part of her estate. ... May God keep Your Grace for 
many years.  
 
Borobia, 4 May 1735. Don Geronimo Alvarez.58 
 
 
In this letter, administrator Don Geronimo Alvarez of Francisco Abad’s pious memories asked 
the diocese for authorization to lend the capital to Pedro Frances. As we can read, the 
administrator already had a precise description and evaluation of the collateral provided in the 
memorandum. Therefore, he could give that crucial information to the diocese for it to consider 
whether the collateral was sufficient or not. The diocese would appear to have agreed since the 
contract was signed on 9 May 1735, five days later. The amount lent was 308 reales, just 13 
percent of the value of the collateral.59 
 
 
Even with a differential of two percentage points, capital did not flow between provinces. Local 
acquaintances are not sufficient to explain such territorial fragmentation between Castile and 
Aragon. As can be seen from my sample, ecclesiastical institutions clearly lent to individuals 
that they may not have known given that their monopoly position meant they could insist on all 
the guarantees they wanted. Grafe contended that although technical transport issues may have 
been overcome, political barriers and jurisdictional obstacles to trade were, by contrast, never 
lifted.60 The fact that the border between Aragon and Castile can be equated with an impassable 
wall for long-term capital flows merely shows how much explicit different institutions can be 
an obstacle to market integration. Beyond explicit barriers between kingdoms, informal 
institutions also play a major role in the presence of jurisdictional obstacles to long-term capital 
flows.  
 
 
IV 
 
 
As a test to assess the impact of jurisdictional barriers within kingdoms and between courts 
(H2), I implemented a gravity model to long-term capital flows. The impact of jurisdictional 
barriers can be estimated by including a dummy variable indicating when the capital flow 
occurs within the jurisdiction and when it occurs with other jurisdictions. I define a market as 
fragmented when jurisdictions influence the pattern of asset transactions. Borders matter when 
borrowers have better access to domestic lenders than lenders in other jurisdictions.  
 
This section also provides new insights into gravity models applied to asset trade. First, I present 
the oldest estimate of the distance elasticity of capital flows, dating back to the eighteenth 
                                                          
58 Own translation. AHPS, caja 1015, vol. 1572. 
59 Pedro Frances’s memorandum of mortgages. On average, the value of collateral was three times the amount of 
the loan. This is slightly lower than the ratio found by Sánchez González, ‘El crédito rural’, in the province of 
Toledo. 
60 Grafe, ‘Tyrannie à distance’, p. 12. 
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century. My results and historical setting support previous findings on the role of market size 
and distance already observed by other studies.61 Second, I use the Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) estimator to estimate the gravity equation as an easy, convenient solution 
in the presence of zero capital flows.62 Lastly, I provide new evidence of a border effect. An 
important line of empirical inquiry in economic geography consists of attempting to explain the 
effect of borders on trade.63 Two classes of explanations have been put forward: the first one 
focuses on transaction costs and informational frictions.64 The second one centers on terms of 
trade changes.65 More recently, Coeurdacier and Aviat also looked at the impact of trade in 
goods on trade in assets.66 My study belongs to the first class of explanations, but I chose here 
to investigate another idea, namely that jurisdictional barriers are a strong deterrent for asset 
trade.  
 
Portes et al posit that a gravity model explains international transactions in financial assets at 
least as well as goods transactions when addressing this question.67 A gravity model for trade 
is a model that explains trade flows between countries i and j by the two masses (GDPs) and 
distance. Extended versions include dummies for trade areas, cultural factors, etc. The purpose 
of this chapter is to measure and explain the sources of capital market fragmentation in early 
modern Spain.  
 
The term gravity equation covers a number of alternative specifications. The most commonly 
used specification takes a log-log format and estimates the parameters of interest by least 
squares. In keeping with Portes and Rey, with a bit of rewriting, I propose the following 
empirical specification (1):68 
 
 
log 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗 = ∝ + 𝛽1 log 𝑌𝑖 +  𝛽2 log 𝑌𝑗 +  𝛽3 log 𝐷𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽4𝑗𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
+  𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑗 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗 
 
 
This equation is very intuitive and similar to the standard gravity equations derived in the 
literature of international trade. 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗 denotes capital flows from city i to j. Obviously, there is 
no such thing as a GDP measure for early modern Spain, especially at local level. Previous 
findings suggest that per capita GDP and population take approximately equal sign.69 I hence 
use the population as a proxy for economic mass: 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑌𝑗 denote the population of city i and 
j.  
 
𝐷𝑖𝑗 denotes the distance between city i and j, measured as the minimum straight-line distance 
in kilometers. Lastly, a jurisdiction dummy is added (jdummy), defined as equal to 1 for intra-
                                                          
61 Martin and Rey, ‘Financial super-markets’; Portes and Rey, ‘Cross-border equity flows’; Coeurdacier and Aviat, 
‘The geography of trade’. 
62 This approach is advocated by Santos Silva and Tenreyro, ‘Log of gravity’. They show that the PPML estimator 
performs very well even with a large proportion of zeros. 
63 To cite just three major studies, see McCallum, ‘National borders matter’; Head and Mayer, ‘Non-Europe’; 
Wolf, ‘International home bias’. 
64 Portes, Rey, and Oh, ‘Information’; Portes and Rey, ‘Cross-border equity flows’. 
65 Cole and Obstfeld,’Commodity trade’; Helpman and Razin, ‘A theory of international trade’. 
66 Coeurdacier and Aviat, ‘The geography of trade’. For a recent survey, see Coeurdacier and Rey, ‘Home bias’.  
67 Portes, Rey, and Oh, ‘Information’. 
68 Portes and Rey, ‘Cross-border equity flows’. 
69 Helliwell, ‘National borders matter’. 
17 
 
jurisdiction capital flows, to measure the impact of jurisdictions on asset trade. 𝜖𝑖𝑗  is the error 
term.  
 
The existence of observations for which the dependent variable is zero creates a problem for 
the use of the log form of the gravity equation. The approach taken by the vast majority of 
empirical studies is to simply drop the pairs of zero trade from the dataset and estimate the log 
form by OLS. Rather than discarding these observations, some authors estimate the model using 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗) as the dependent variable or a tobit estimator. These procedures generally 
produce inconsistent estimators of the parameters of interest. One way of obtaining a more 
efficient estimator than the standard OLS is to estimate the parameters of interest using a PPML 
estimator, since it allows for a large number of zeros in the dependent variable.70 
 
The theory suggests that the capital flow from city i to city j is proportional to the population 
of the two cities and inversely proportional to their distance, 𝐷𝑖𝑗. I also would expect 
jurisdiction barriers (i.e., if the two cities do not belong to the same jurisdiction), which could 
be interpreted as a proxy for enforcement costs in the event of litigation, to be negatively 
correlated with capital flow. Lastly, I add city dummies to control for aggregate shocks. 
 
One potential problem pointed by the literature is that policy variables may be endogenous and 
their coefficients inconsistent because of “reverse causality” or an omitted variable.71 In the 
case of jurisdictions for example, reverse causality would imply that the volume of capital flows 
between two cities also determine if they are part of a same jurisdiction or not. However, this 
is unlikely to happen. Jurisdictions in Spain were historical outcomes determined by political 
stakes. Nevertheless, one solution to address this problem is to draw on a natural experiment, 
which I did in section III using the reduction of the interest rate ceiling in 1705 as an exogenous 
shock hitting only Castile and not Aragon.  
  
The empirical results presented below are based on the Cadastre of Ensenada. The Cadastre 
was conducted throughout Castile at the beginning of the 1750s. It collected information on 
wealth and population for each city and village. In particular, it recorded mortgage loans, the 
censos consignativos mentioned earlier, secured on real assets located in the city. So the 
Cadastre lists the borrowers’ stock of censos for each place for a given year (generally 1751 or 
1752). 
 
For each censo, the Cadastre provides information on the borrower’s and the lender’s names, 
their cities of origin, the capital, the interest rate, and the mortgaged asset. Based on this 
evidence, I can observe intra-jurisdictional capital flows and cross-jurisdictional flows for each 
place. Obviously, a study of Castile in its entirety is beyond this study. The data contained in 
the Cadastre is considerable and censos information is not listed in a separate section.72 I have 
therefore restricted my study to the judicial district of Ágreda in the province of Soria.73 The 
                                                          
70 Whenever distance is equal to zero (intra-city lending), I use 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗). 
71 Head, K. and Mayer, T., ‘Gravity equations: workhorse, toolkit, and cookbook’, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 
9322. 
72 In addition, Cadastre archives are not centralized, but are kept at provincial level in the Archivos Históricos 
Provinciales. 
73 Ágreda was a corregimiento. These were administrative and judicial districts under the ancien regime. The 
corregimiento of Ágreda was chosen for its common border with the Kingdom of Aragon (which was under study 
in section III). See Heras Santos, ‘La organización de la justicia’, p. 128, for a complete list of corregimientos. 
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data covers the 17 cities in the district and I collected information on 442 censos.74 I identified 
23 cities of origin for the capital lent in the judicial district of Ágreda, making a total of 368 
observations (23 × 16).75 Summary statistics for the population and capital flow data are given 
in the Appendix. 
    
The population was drawn from the Aranda census (1768). Where this information was not 
available, the Floridablanca census (1789) was used.76 Ágreda was the main recipient of capital 
flows (83 per cent of the total in value), which is not surprising since it was the administrative 
centre of the judicial district and concentrated a large share of its population (almost 50 per 
cent). Intra-jurisdictional flows accounted for almost 70 per cent of total capital flows, 58 per 
cent of which were intra-city flows. Eight of the 23 cities of origin did not belong to the judicial 
district of Ágreda and 15 kilometers separated lenders from borrowers on average. Among these 
eight cities, the majority of capital flows came from Pamplona, Alfaro and Soria, three other 
main judicial district centres. In general, these were large one-off transactions among the cities’ 
elites.   
 
As expected, distance certainly had a substantial and negative effect on capital flows. Figure 4 
gives the histogram of the distance between borrowers and lenders. It confirms the local 
character of long-term credit activities while showing that some transactions involved distant 
parties.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distance between borrowers and lenders (pair of cities). 
 
 
 
                                                          
74 For a list of cities by districts, see España dividida en provincias e intendencias (1789), vol. 1, pp. 488-9, 
available at http://www.bne.es/es/Catalogos/BibliotecaDigitalHispanica/Inicio/index.html. One of them, 
Conejares, a very small village, does not contain any information on mortgages. Cities of destination are: Ágreda, 
Añavieja, Beratón, Castilruiz, Devanos, Fuentestrún, La Aldehuela, La Cueva, Las Fuentes de Ágreda, 
Matalebreras, Montenegro de Ágreda, Muro de Ágreda, San Felices, Trévago, Valdelagua, and Vozmediano. Data 
has been collected from AHPS, Cajas 9471-9474, 9958, 9544, 9561, 9595, 9626, 9658, 9493, 9624, 9656, 9708, 
10012, 9741, 9833, 9886 and 9892. 
75 Cities of origin are: Ágreda, La Aldehuela, Alfaro, Añavieja, Beratón, Cascante, Castilruiz, La Cueva, Devanos, 
Las Fuentes, Fuentestrún, La Cuesta, Matalebreras, Montenegro, Muro de Ágreda, Noviercas, Pamplona, San 
Felices, San Pedro Manrique, Soria, Trévago, Valdelagua and Vozmediano. One obvious outlier was removed 
from the dataset: two small loans for a total amount of 1,650 reales between the city of Ágreda and the city of 
Malaga, 610 kilometres away. 
76 They are both available on the Instituto Nacional de Estadística website at http://www.ine.es. 
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Source: see text. 
 
 
 
I estimate equation (1) with the PPML procedure. The equation includes a constant term and 
city dummies to control for aggregate shocks, whose estimates are not reported. The dependent 
variable 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗 is the capital flow from city i to city j. The estimation procedure gives 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, which are shown in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The gravity equation: PPML estimator. 
 
Estimator: PPMLa 
Dependent variable: log 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗 
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Log of populationi 2.200*** 
 (0.583) 
Log of populationj 1.881*** 
 (0.347) 
Log distance -0.756*** 
 (0.274) 
Jurisdiction dummy 2.331** 
 (1.076) 
Observations 368 
a Full set of city dummies. 
Note: Significance levels: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Sources: See text. 
 
 
Both population size variables return the expected signs with very well-determined coefficients. 
Distance elasticity is appropriately negatively signed (-0.73) and precisely estimated (s.e. = 
0.27). This confirms the results of previous studies on asset trade. It is comparable to what 
Portes and Rey found (-0.7) and a little bit higher than the effect observed by Coeurdacier and 
Aviat, between -0.4 and -0.7.77 I also explore the role of jurisdictional barriers: the Poisson 
regression indicates that jurisdictional ties play a role in determining capital flows. The Poisson 
estimates suggest that belonging the same jurisdiction multiplies expected capital flows by 
almost 10.78 Compared to trade in goods, this result is similar to the finding made by Wei, but 
is below the (probably overestimated) value of 20 obtained by McCallum.79 This means that 
fragmentation between Spanish jurisdictions at that time was almost as strong as between 
countries today.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V 
 
 
                                                          
77 Portes and Rey, ‘Cross-border equity flows’; Coeurdacier and Aviat, ‘The geography of trade’. 
78 The formula to compute this effect is (𝑒𝛽𝑖 − 1)  × 100%, where 𝛽𝑖 is the estimated coefficient. 
79 Wei, S.-J., ‘Intra-national versus international trade: how stubborn are nations in global integration?’, NBER 
Working Paper no. 5531. McCallum, ‘National borders matter’, used an OLS procedure which overestimates the 
effect of borders and distance. Using an OLS procedure, I also find much higher results. Estimating equation (1) 
with 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗) as the dependent variable, the model predicts that distance elasticity is -1.17 and that capital 
flows between two cities within the same jurisdiction will be 100 times higher than capital flows between cities 
from different jurisdictions. 
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The road to market integration is long. I analyse new data on long-term private loans, called 
censos consignativos, in the crowns of Castile and Aragon in eighteenth-century Spain. To my 
knowledge, this study is the first to uncover and measure a specific jurisdiction-based pattern 
of capital flows in early modern times.  
 
I derive the estimated equation from a simple gravity model. I show that jurisdictional barriers 
between cities have a strong negative impact on long-term capital flows and confirm that 
distance, a proxy for information frictions and transport costs, plays a negative role. Long-term 
capital flows are predicted to be ten times higher within the same jurisdiction than between two 
different jurisdictions.  
 
I also show that even large differentials in interest rates do not reverse this pattern. Using a 
large gap of two percentage points between Castile and Aragon for 45 years, I observe that there 
were hardly any long-term capital flows between the two crowns and that interest rates 
remained at their legal ceilings while markets remained local. A number of explanations can be 
put forward for this lack of long-term cross-border credit. Among them, I believe legal 
institutions to be decisive elements in the fragmentation of long-term capital markets.   
 
Local control over justice and the different legal systems imposed massive transaction costs on 
local credit market activities. Legal fragmentation increased legal risk in the capital market and 
impeded capital mobility between historic territories. On the one hand, explicit different 
institutions between kingdoms created barriers to judicial cooperation and increased the gap 
between the number of requests and the number of cases dealt with, as repeatedly mentioned 
by the kingdoms’ assemblies. On the other hand, informal institutions within cities represented 
a cause for slowness in legal assistance procedures, even a reason of resistance to judicial 
cooperation. This certainly was another obstacle encountered by citizens in the enforcement of 
their rights which depressed cross-border economic activity.   
 
To come back to Epstein, state formation alongside the development of a judiciary system and 
the “judicialization” of social relations does not necessary guarantee the development of an 
integrated market. The mere observation of the development of these systems cannot suffice to 
infer the emergence of favorable conditions for the integration of the market: this view is, 
precisely, too focused on institutions, to the detriment of the use that is made of them. Judicial 
cooperation and the administration of justice within a composite monarchy are also key to a 
more integrated market. These requirements do not appear to have been met in Spain due to the 
kind of political economy in place.  
 
In this setting, Spain was certainly rather the norm than the exception. Italy and the former 
German kingdoms are then better comparators than centralized England. Like the majority of 
its European counterparts, Spain suffered from coordination problems in the absence of a 
centralized state. In our case, this led to the great fragmentation of long-term capital markets. 
However, other institutions than the state managed to circumvent these jurisdictional barriers. 
In Spain, some ecclesiastical orders developed into a highly sophisticated and integrated 
system.80 They acted through a vast network of convents and monasteries, supplying everything 
from small loans to farmers in a local market to substantial amounts to nobles, merchants, 
officials, and local treasuries across the whole country and beyond. Their three-tier system, with 
the General Curia at the top in Madrid and then the provincial houses and the local convents 
scattered over all of Spain, allowed them to address all kinds of demands, to solve asymmetric 
                                                          
80 Milhaud, C., Sacré crédit ! The rise and fall of ecclesiastical institutions in early modern Spain, unpublished 
thesis (2017). 
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information problems, and to circumvent the strong jurisdictional barriers inherent to these 
markets. Of course, this was a second best. These particular institutions also had their own 
purposes and constraints which were not directly connected to the economy. As such, they only 
offered long-term mortgage loans and this integrated market was limited to big loans. 
 
In the end, the administration of justice and, more generally, jurisdictional fragmentation 
whereby transaction costs and risks were driven upwards were certainly not the only reason for 
slow market development. Economic performance in ancient regime societies was indirectly 
affected by the official justice system. However, the evolution of the composite monarchy and 
pacts among the elites created obstacles to the formation of a solid base for a more efficient 
political economy, which might have reduced risks and transaction costs. At the end of the 
sixteenth century, a very well-informed arbitrista, Sancho de Moncada, wrote that, “Many 
people complain that they cannot even set a foot on the ground without breaking some of the 
laws of Spain”.81 This situation certainly had an impact on the allocation of productive factors, 
which could have affected long-term financing.  
 
 
 
Appendix 
  
Summary statistics 
 
City of 
destination 
Population Capital flows (reales) 
  Without zeroes With zeroes 
  Mean Number 
of cities 
of origin 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Ágreda 3,594 82,813 12 43,206 136,828 0 623,655 
La Aldehuela 189 4,125 1 179 860 0 4,125 
Añavieja 122 2,160 1 93 450 0 2,160 
Beratón 231 3,025 2 263 1,197 0 5,750 
Castilruiz 597 11,609 5 2,523 7,640 0 35,048 
La Cueva 258 3,070 3 400 1,642 0 7,880 
Devanos 196 745 2 64 254 0 1,200 
Las Fuentes 266 18,657 2 1,622 5,390 0 19,986 
Fuentestrún 220 1,716 2 149 528 0 2,333 
Matalebreras 454 17,204 3 2,244 8,657 0 41,360 
Montenegro 108 250 1 10 52 0 250 
Muro 290 4,403 2 382 1,456 0 6,777 
San Felices 371 870 1 37 181 0 870 
Trévago 430 3,799 3 495 1,672 0 7,355 
Valdelagua 345 1,500 1 65 312 0 1,500 
Vozmediano 348 5,750 1 250 1,198 0 5,750 
Number of different cities of origin 23 
Distance (km)  Mean 21.8 
      Min 0 
      Max 122.7 
                                                          
81 Moncada, Restauración política, p. 201. 
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Sources: See text. 
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